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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the association between analyst forecast dispersion and investors’ 
perceived uncertainty toward earnings. I construct a new measure for investors’ expectation of 
earnings announcement uncertainty using changes in implied volatility of option contracts prior 
to earnings announcement. Unlike other proxies of uncertainty, this measure isolates the 
incremental uncertainty regarding the upcoming earnings announcement and target the same 
future release of periodical earnings instead of concurrent uncertainty. Using this new proxy, I 
find a significant negative correlation between analyst forecast dispersion and investors’ 
uncertainty in regards to upcoming earnings announcement. This finding is consistent with the 
story that analyst forecast dispersion on average represents information asymmetry among 
analysts rather than analysts’ uncertainty toward earnings numbers. Further tests show that this 
negative relationship is more pronounced in the subsample with lower earnings quality where 
analyst forecast dispersion is more likely to be a proxy of information asymmetry among 
analysts. This paper helps to further researchers’ understanding of the information contained in 
analyst forecast dispersion and introduces a new market-based proxy of earnings announcement 
uncertainty.   
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my mother and father for their everlasting love and support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iv 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
              I am greatly indebted to my adviser, Laura Li, for her guidance and support. I 
have learned a lot from her and would like to thank her for her valuable advice and words 
of encouragement. I could not have completed this project and degree without her 
guidance, help and support. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to Heitor 
Almeida. He has read through many versions of my dissertation and provided brilliant 
comments and suggestions to help me improve my work. I am extremely grateful to 
Theodore Sougiannis and David Koo for being with me on my dissertation committee 
and helping me through the process of this degree. I greatly appreciate the guidance and 
support from Jon Davis. 
              Finally and most importantly, I would like to thank my parents, my peers in the 
doctoral program, and my numerous friends, especially Jimmy and Peter, who endured 
this long process with me, always offering support and love.  
 
 
 
  v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………1 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………………………….7 
CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN….........15 
CHAPTER 4: SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS…………..20 
CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS…………………………………………………24 
CHAPTER 6: ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS.................28 
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS…………...………………………..31 
FIGURES AND TABLES……………………………………………………………….32 
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………..52 
APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL RELATED PROPOSAL……………………………....56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 1 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 The information content of analyst forecast dispersion1 has long been a topic of interest in 
accounting and finance literature. Givoly and Lakonishok (1984) first argue that the level of 
analyst forecast dispersion reflects the level of uncertainty regarding firms’ future performance. 
The literature that followed has used analyst forecast dispersion as either a proxy for uncertainty 
or information asymmetry among analysts (i.e., a lack of consensus); however, Barron et al. 
(1998) suggest that analyst forecast dispersion is likely to be a proxy for both uncertainty and 
information asymmetry among analysts. Using an analytical model, Barron et al. (1998) 
decompose analyst forecast dispersion into uncertainty (common forecast error) and information 
asymmetry (idiosyncratic forecast error). This decomposition process has been widely used in 
recent research (e.g. Barron et al. (2002), Botosan et al. (2004), Barron et al. (2009), and Byard 
et al. (2011)).  Despite the theoretical appeal of Barron et al.’s (1998) model, many other papers 
do not utilize the decomposition process; instead, they continue to use total analyst forecast 
dispersion as a proxy for the uncertainty of future earnings. For example, Zhang (2006) uses 
analyst forecast dispersion directly, without decomposition, to measure the uncertainty of future 
earnings, as do Diether et al. (2002) and Johnson (2004). Without knowing the extent to which 
total analyst forecast dispersion as a whole captures uncertainty or information asymmetry 
                                                          
1 Analyst forecast dispersion is defined in this paper as the standard deviation of individual 
analyst forecasts issued within 30 days of an earnings announcement and deflated by the prior 
fiscal quarter’s final stock price. There are other alternative measures of analyst forecast 
dispersion. For example, Sheng and Thevenot (2011) use a GARCH model to create a new 
measure of uncertainty from individual analyst forecasts. Their GARCH model requires a long 
time series of data to estimate; thus, it is not considered in this paper.  
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among analysts, it is difficult to interpret results from these prior literature. For example, the 
negative correlation they find between analyst forecast dispersion and future abnormal return can 
either be driven by uncertainty (if total analyst forecast dispersion proxy for uncertainty) or 
information asymmetry among analysts (if total analyst forecast dispersion proxy for information 
asymmetry). In this study, I first construct a refined measure of investors’ perceived uncertainty 
toward upcoming earnings announcement using option contract’s implied volatility and then 
look at how analyst forecast dispersion is associated with the uncertainty that investors perceive 
in upcoming earnings announcements. I also examine whether Barron et al. (1998)’s 
decomposition process is empirically valid.  
I develop a measure that uses the change in the implied volatility of exchange-traded 
option contracts prior to scheduled earnings announcement to evaluate investors’ expected 
market uncertainty related to the upcoming earnings announcement. The level of option contracts’ 
implied volatility measures the average expected total price volatility between measurement date 
and the expiration date of the option contract. This total uncertainty measure is heavily affected 
by firm characteristics such as size, financial risk (e.g.: leverage) and operating risk. By taking 
the first difference of the implied volatility of two option contracts that expires immediately prior 
to earnings announcement and expires 30 days after upcoming earnings announcement, my 
measure isolates the incremental uncertainty towards the upcoming earnings announcement and 
controls for firms’ normal business uncertainty. Since analysts are also making prediction of the 
same upcoming earnings number, this measure provides an estimation of the uncertainty that 
closely matches the uncertainty embedded in analyst forecast dispersion regarding the upcoming 
earnings number.   
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If analyst forecast dispersion, on average, represents uncertainty regarding earnings 
numbers, analyst forecast dispersion should be positively associated with investors’ perceived 
uncertainty regarding the upcoming earnings announcement since they both represent the ex-ante 
uncertainty of the same construct: earnings. On the other hand, if analyst forecast dispersion 
represents information asymmetry among analysts, theoretically it proxies the private 
information acquisition among analysts (Barron et al. 1998 use similar intuition in their 
analytical model). As more private information is gathered and released to the market, the market 
price aggregates these pieces of private information and less uncertainty toward earning is left 
during future earnings announcement leading to a negative correlation between analyst forecast 
dispersion and expected future earnings announcement uncertainty. The intuition of this negative 
correlation is also modeled by Kim and Verrecchia (1991) who shows analytically that as the 
diversity of opinion among information processors (analysts) increases, stock price becomes 
more informative (less uncertain) at the time of earnings announcement.  
Using both uni-variate correlation and multi-variate regression analysis that controls for 
macro-economic and firm specific variables, I find that total analyst forecast dispersion is 
significantly negatively correlated with investors’ expected uncertainty toward upcoming 
earnings announcement. These results support the later hypothesis and suggest that analyst 
forecast dispersion on average represents information asymmetry among analysts for the 
population of U.S. firms.  
To further understand the relationship between analyst forecast dispersion and market 
uncertainty, I hypothesize that this negative relationship is moderated by the quality of a firm’s 
earnings if analyst forecast dispersion is indeed a proxy of information asymmetry among 
analysts. Prior theoretical research by Kim and Verrecchia (1991) shows that as the quality of 
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previously received information signals decrease (low earnings quality), investors have more 
incentives to acquire private information. Based on their prediction of this complementary 
relationship between the quality of public information and the acquisition of private information 
by analysts, private information (as proxied by information asymmetry among analysts) plays a 
more important role in terms of forming earnings expectation and reducing market uncertainty 
when the quality of public information is low. I predict that the negative correlation between 
analyst forecast dispersion is more intensified when earnings quality is low. Such moderating 
effect of earnings quality should not, a priori, exist if analyst forecast dispersion on average 
proxies uncertainty. In my empirical test, I find that the subsample with firms of low quality 
earnings (as proxied by various earnings quality measures including performance matched 
modified Jones model measure and earnings smoothness), analyst forecast dispersion has a 
stronger negative correlation with investors’ perceived market uncertainty toward earnings 
announcements. These findings suggest that analyst forecast dispersion, on average, represents 
information asymmetry among analysts due to analysts’ development of private information.  
An additional robustness test using inter-temporal data shows that the moderating effect 
of earnings quality discussed in the previous paragraph also appears in the context of accounting 
restatement. In this test, I use a firm’s accounting restatement as a proxy for a sudden decrease in 
perceived earnings quality. Based on similar deduction, I predict that the negative correlation 
between analyst forecast dispersion and investors’ expected uncertainty toward earnings is more 
pronounced in the post-restatement period due to increased private information acquisition than 
in the pre-restatement period. My empirical tests support the hypothesis and find that the 
negative association between analyst forecast dispersion and investor perceived uncertainty 
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toward earnings announcement becomes more pronounced for the same firm after the 
restatement than before the restatement.  
To reconcile my results with Barron et al. (1998), I follow their process and decompose 
analyst forecast dispersion into information asymmetry and uncertainty portions. Empirical tests 
using decomposed analyst forecast dispersion show that the information asymmetry portion of 
analyst forecast dispersion is significantly negatively correlated with investor’s expected market 
uncertainty toward earnings while the uncertainty portion is significantly positively correlated 
with investors’ uncertainty measure. These results provide supporting empirical evidence of the 
validity of the variance decomposition process developed by Barron et al. (1998).  
In summary, this paper investigates the informational content of analyst forecast 
dispersion and its association with investors’ perceived uncertainty towards earnings 
announcements. It contributes to accounting and finance literature in two different ways. First, I 
present evidence showing that analyst forecast dispersion, on average, represents information 
asymmetry among analysts rather than uncertainty toward earnings. I further validate this 
allegation by demonstrating that this negative association is more pronounced when a firm faces 
lower-quality earnings. Second, I propose and validate an ex ante and market-based uncertainty 
measure that isolates the market expected uncertainty toward earnings announcement only. This 
measure is readily available and does not require a long time series of data to estimate. 
Additional tests show that this measure is significantly correlated with future idiosyncratic risk 
and future investor opinion divergence variables. It is not correlated with either the current 
quarter’s idiosyncratic risk or the current quarter’s investor opinion divergence variables. For 
these reasons, it is an ideal candidate to serve as a proxy for forward-looking uncertainty 
surrounding an earnings announcement.  
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The rest of the paper unfolds along the following lines: Chapter 2 reviews related 
literature. Chapter 3 develops hypotheses and illustrate research design. Chapter 4 presents 
descriptive statistics of the sample and the statistical properties of market uncertainty derived 
from implied volatility. Chapter 5 presents the main test results on the hypotheses proposed 
earlier, and in Chapter 6, additional robustness test results are presented. Chapter 7 concludes the 
paper.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Analyst forecast dispersion 
Prior literature in accounting and finance interpret analyst forecast dispersion differently. 
The majority of the literature uses analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for uncertainty related to 
firms’ price-relevant fundamentals. This proxy is typically calculated as the standard deviation of 
the most updated individual analyst forecasted earnings per share deflated by average price. For 
some time, accounting and finance literature has investigated the information content of analyst 
forecast dispersion, but existing empirical results are inconclusive. Givoly and Lakonishok (1984) 
first argue that analyst forecast dispersion is related to a firm’s future level of uncertainty. Daley 
et al. (1988) tested Givoly and Lakonichsok’s theoretical prediction and find that forecast 
dispersion is in fact positively correlated with forecast error and a firm’s implied volatility level; 
however, their results are inconsistent with Imhoff and Lobo (1992), who locate a negative 
correlation between dispersion and future earnings response coefficient (ERC). Abarbanell, 
Lanen, and Verrecchia (1995) explain Imhoff and Lobo’s (1992) results by arguing that 
uncertainty after an earnings announcement may trigger investors to acquire more private 
information, which in turn leads to a higher level of analyst forecast dispersion. This increased 
information asymmetry among analysts could lead to a negative correlation between analyst 
forecast dispersion and the market’s future response to earnings.  
Barron et al. (1998) first combines these two streams of research regarding analyst 
forecast dispersion and model analyst forecast dispersion as representing both uncertainty and 
information asymmetry among analysts (due to analysts’ individual private information 
acquisition). The intuition behind their model is that the correlation between individual analyst 
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forecast error measures analysts’ use of public information while the variation around mean 
forecast reflects analysts’ use of private information. Barron et al (1998) calculate the mean 
squared error of each individual analysts’ forecast to measure average uncertainty toward 
earnings numbers and divide total dispersion by mean squared error to measure information 
asymmetry among analysts. Following accounting literature testing the validity of Barron et al. 
(1998)’s measure shows that the theoretical decomposition process is consistent with empirical 
evidence (e.g., Barron et al. (2002), Barron et al. (2009))  
Despite the appealing Barron et al (1998)’s model, a large body of literature does not use 
this decomposition process and simply assumes that total analyst forecast dispersion is a proxy of 
uncertainty toward earnings numbers. One example is the literature studying the equity market 
consequence of analyst forecast dispersion that finds a significantly negative correlation between 
total analyst forecast dispersion and future abnormal return. Zhang (2006) uses analyst forecast 
dispersion directly as a proxy for uncertainty of future earnings. Diether et al. (2002) and 
Johnson (2004) both use analyst forecast dispersion as proxy of firm level uncertainty toward 
future performance without decomposition. Literature rarely decompose analyst forecast 
dispersion into uncertainty and information asymmetry among analysts and tend to use total 
dispersion as a proxy of uncertainty only. Without knowing exactly to what extent total 
dispersion proxy for uncertainty or information asymmetry among analysts, it is difficult to 
interpret prior literature’s results on the consequences of analyst forecast dispersion since the 
cross-sectional difference of analyst forecast dispersion could either be driven by uncertainty or 
information asymmetry among analysts due to individual analyst’s private information 
acquisition.  
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In summary, it is evident from prior literature on the information content of analyst 
forecast dispersion that analyst forecast dispersion is likely a proxy of both uncertainty and 
information asymmetry among analysts. The current study contributes to this literature by 
identifying whether on average analyst forecast dispersion proxy for uncertainty or information 
asymmetry among analysts.  
 
2.2 Motivation for a market-based uncertainty measure  
Prior academic research on analyst forecast dispersion typically uses cumulative 
abnormal return after earnings announcement, cost of capital, or earnings response coefficient 
(ERC) as dependent variable to examine the information content of analyst forecast dispersion. 
Since analyst forecast dispersion measures analysts’ ex ante uncertainty or disagreement toward 
upcoming earnings numbers, in order to investigate the exact information content of analyst 
forecast dispersion, we need an exogenous measure that either directly measures ex ante 
uncertainty toward earnings or measures the level of analysts’ disagreement. Since it is difficult 
to gauge analysts’ individual private information since each individual analyst has different 
incentive, utility function, and access to information, a natural alternative candidate to consider is 
the market expected uncertainty toward earnings announcement. The exchange-traded options 
contracts provide a fruitful venue to extract such ex ante information of uncertainty toward 
earnings.  
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Implied volatility2 is the value of the volatility when plug into an option pricing model 
(e.g., Black-Scholes Merton Model or binomial model) returns the theoretical value of the option 
that equals the current market price of the option contract (Mayhew 1995). It provides a 
comparable measure of the value of option contract across different strike price, expiration date, 
and put/call contracts. Theoretically, it is an ex ante measure of the average expected total risk of 
the underlying equity stock that extends over the life of the option, until it expires (Ross 1978). 
Various prior literature has displayed that implied volatility is indeed a forward-looking measure 
of uncertainty and is superior to historical volatility (Canina and Figlewski (1993), Christensen 
and Prabhala (1998)). Implied volatility also captures the expected volatility induced by 
scheduled news release such as an upcoming earnings announcement. Ederington and Lee’s 
(1996) model shows that ISD impounds the anticipated impact that important news will have on 
price volatility for a scheduled announcement. They use an index option and macro-economic 
news announcement to test their model and confirm its prediction. Other empirical studies (Patell 
and Wolfson, 1979, 1981; Isakov and Perignon 2001) document that implied volatility also 
increases before other scheduled news announcements (e.g., earnings announcements) and 
declines thereafter. As a qualification, however, the extent of this decline depends on the 
information that the earnings announcement contains (i.e., good news or bad news). Specifically, 
Isakov and Perignon (2001) empirically document this feature in the evolution of implied 
volatility—the leverage effect, in which negative shock (bad news) has a greater impact on 
volatility than a positive shock and it takes longer for implied volatility to return to norm after 
negative news. Based on these findings, researchers now agree that implied volatility generally 
reaches a local maximum one day before the scheduled earnings announcement and gradually 
                                                          
2 In this paper, I use implied volatility inter-changeably with implied standard deviation, which is 
the square root of implied volatility or “ISD” 
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decreases until it reaches its long-term norm. Future changes in implied volatility depends on the 
news that an earnings announcement contains.  
These studies demonstrate that implied volatility is an ex ante measure that captures the 
uncertainty in the market around earnings announcement. Options market provides a potentially 
useful venue to extract market expected uncertainty toward earnings announcement.   
 
2.3 Investors’ uncertainty toward earnings announcement  
In this study, I propose three reasons for using implied volatility from exchange-traded 
option contracts to derive a measure of market uncertainty instead of relying on well-established 
traditional uncertainty measures such as idiosyncratic risk, total risk or other investor opinion 
divergence measures. First, implied volatility is a market-based measure, and measures derived 
from an actively traded market have an innate advantage over others because they are less 
distorted by incentives. Second, implied volatility is a forward-looking measure; thus, it matches 
the ex-ante property of analyst forecasted earnings. Third—and perhaps most important—the 
estimation process is simple and does not involve long time series of data. This reduces the 
probability of measurement error.   
When investigating how the option prices reflect risks embedded in earnings, it is 
important to understand the evolution of implied volatility around earnings announcements. 
Periodic pre-scheduled earnings announcements contain critical information regarding the level 
and volatility of a firm’s equity price. The original Black-Scholes model is a static model where 
the underlying volatility of a stock is assumed to remain constant, and its creators use implied 
volatility to represent the average instantaneous volatility over the remaining life of the option. 
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Thus, implied volatility here is a forward-looking measure of expected future uncertainty over 
the life of the option. Implied volatility should account for any expected volatility shock from 
scheduled news announcements over the remaining life of the option contract. If a stock return’s 
volatility on the day of an earnings announcement is higher than on days without an 
announcement, the implied volatility of the option contract will increase as the earnings 
announcement approaches. Implied volatility increases as time approach earnings announcement 
because the market put a higher weight of time (lower discount rate) on the expected high 
volatility after earnings announcement. Given the above theoretical reasoning provided by Patell 
and Wolfson (1979), the implied volatility of a firm’s option contract should gradually increase 
prior to the earnings announcement. It will reach its peak immediately before the earnings 
announcement date. After this announcement, the implied volatility should decrease to its long-
term level if no other information disclosures have been scheduled immediately thereafter. Patell 
and Wolfson (1979, 1981) empirically confirm this theory regarding the evolution of implied 
volatility around the earnings announcement. They use data from the U.S. equity market while 
assuming that instantaneous volatility remains constant, except on the earnings disclosure dates. 
Donders and Vorst (1996) summarize the results of Patell and Wolfson (1981) with a simple 
model that represents the evolution of implied volatility around earnings announcement:  
𝐼𝑆𝐷0,𝜏 = √
𝜏 − 1
𝜏
𝜎𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙
2 +
1
𝜏
𝜎ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
2  
ISD refers to the implied standard deviation; τ represents the number of days until the 
option contract expires. Normal volatility is the volatility of stock price without a scheduled 
earnings announcement, and high volatility is the volatility on the day of the earnings 
announcement.  
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Recent empirical results suggest that the change in implied volatility around an earnings 
announcement also reflects options market’s expectation of upcoming earnings news. Isakof and 
Perignon (2000) find that a negative earnings announcement leads to greater implied volatility 
after the earnings announcement. Additionally, it takes longer for implied volatility to recede to 
its normal level than it does after a positive earnings announcement. Skinner (1990) and Ho 
(1993) both provide evidence that option listing improves the information environment of 
individual firms by reducing the abnormal return as well as the post earnings announcement 
price drift. Amin and Lee (1997) portray that option traders engage in directional trading as they 
anticipate the dissemination of earnings news. In fact, Chakravarty et al. (2004) show that the 
options market contributes to a hefty 17% of price discovery on average. Ni et al. (2008) also 
confirm that traders exchange information about volatility around earnings announcements. 
More recently, Billings and Jennings (2011) propose a new measure, which is calculated as the 
price of soon to expire option contract deflated by analyst forecast dispersion. They show that 
this measure is correlated with future ERC. These studies suggest that as least part of the 
increase in implied volatility prior to earnings announcement is market’s expectation of the 
increased volatility induced by upcoming earnings announcement. In this study, I follow these 
prior literatures and reverse the formula proposed by Donders and Vorst (1996) to infer the 
market expected uncertainty only related to the upcoming earnings announcement.  
Specifically, I decompose implied volatility into two components: normal implied 
volatility and high implied volatility induced by scheduled earnings announcement. The 
decomposition can be estimated quarterly by using option contracts of similar term (call option, 
same date to expiration, and both at the money) measured at different point in time. The 
estimation method is structured around the timeline of an earnings announcement. As illustrated 
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in Figure 1, the day of an earnings announcement is denoted as “current earnings announcement 
day”. I focus on the implied volatility of option contracts with the shortest time to expiration. 
These option contracts have the highest delta (option price’s sensitivity to stock price change) 
and vega (option price’s sensitivity to stock volatility change) and are most sensitive to changes 
of firm risk and stock price. I obtain implied volatility of standardized option contracts with 
hypothesized 30 days to expiration available from the Option-Metrics database. Standardized 
options3 are calculated as at-the-money contracts with constant time to maturity. Thirty-one days 
before an earnings announcement, the implied volatility contains only the average volatility 
expected over the next 30 days; thus, it does not contain information of the volatility on the day 
of an earnings announcement. This σ T-31 is used as benchmark volatility since it only contains 
the normal level of uncertainty (σ normal) in the Donders and Vorst (1996) model and is closest 
to the earnings announcement date. The σ T-1 is the implied volatility one day prior to an 
earnings announcement; thus, it gives the heaviest weight on the incremental volatility (σ high) 
in the Donders and Vorst (1996) model and represents ISD in the model. By reserving the 
Donders and Vorst (1996) model, √(𝜎𝑡−1)2 − (𝜎𝑡−31)2  yields an ex ante measure of the 
incremental uncertainty (σ high) from an earnings announcement, as it is expected by option 
traders. This measure isolates investors’ uncertainty toward upcoming earnings announcement 
and controls for firm’s normal volatility.  
 
 
                                                          
3 The implied volatility for a standardized 30-day as-if at-the-money option is calculated as the 
weighted average of the implied volatilities of the four traded options with strike prices i and j 
and days to maturity of m and n, such that the current stock price is right between i and j, and 
time to maturity is across 30 days: m<30<n. (Rogers et al. 2009) 
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Hypotheses development  
To investigate the information content of analyst forecast dispersion, I test empirically 
the relation between analyst forecast dispersion and my self-constructed measure of investor’s 
uncertainty toward earnings announcement. If analyst forecast dispersion, on average, represents 
uncertainty regarding earnings numbers, then analyst forecast dispersion should be positively 
associated with investors’ perceived uncertainty regarding the upcoming earnings announcement 
since they both represents the ex-ante uncertainty of the same construct: earnings numbers. On 
the other hand, if analyst forecast dispersion represents information asymmetry among analysts, 
it should be negatively associated with investors’ perceived uncertainty toward the upcoming 
earnings announcement. The intuition of this negative correlation is modeled by Kim and 
Verrecchia (1994) who show analytically that as the diversity of opinion among information 
processors (analysts) increases, stock price becomes more informative and less uncertain at the 
time of earnings announcement. As analysts produce more private information regarding the 
earnings, the market aggregates these pieces of information into price and the expected price 
uncertainty during earnings announcement (my dependent variable) is reduced. In light of these 
conflicting predictions regarding the correlation between analyst forecast dispersion and 
investors’ uncertainty toward earnings, I make the following competing hypotheses:  
H1a: Analyst forecast dispersion is positively correlated with investors’ perceived uncertainty 
regarding an upcoming earnings announcement. 
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H1b: Analyst forecast dispersion is negatively correlated with investors’ perceived uncertainty 
regarding an upcoming earnings announcement. 
My empirical test of hypothesis one supports H1b and suggests that analyst forecast 
dispersion on average proxies for the information asymmetry among analysts. To enhance the 
validity of this conclusion, I further hypothesize that such negative association should be 
moderated through firms’ earnings quality if analyst forecast dispersion is indeed a proxy for 
information asymmetry among analysts. Kim and Verrecchina (1991) show that as the noise of 
prior information signals increases, investors have incentives to acquire more private information. 
Kim and Verrecchina (1991)’s model indicates that analysts have more incentives to acquire 
private information when facing low earnings quality. This prediction implies that the acquisition 
of private information by analysts (as proxied by information asymmetry among analysts) plays 
a more important role in terms of forming earnings expectation and reducing market uncertainty 
when the quality of public information is low. 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) were the first to examine the effect that the quality of 
financial reporting has on analyst forecast dispersion. In the process, they show that firms with 
better policies for information disclosure enjoy a lower level of analyst forecast dispersion. 
Healy et al. (1999) and Byard and Shaw (2003) use AIMR score to confirm this relationship; yet, 
their results do not help distinguish whether analyst forecast dispersion represents uncertainty or 
information asymmetry among analysts. There are two reasons for this lingering doubt. First, the 
acquisition of private information is endogenous to earnings quality. As the quality of prior 
information (disclosure quality) decreases, investors (analysts) tend to acquire more private 
information (Kim and Verrecchia 1991). Recent empirical evidence provided by Lobo et al. 
(2012) confirms this theoretical prediction and provide corroborating evidence that analysts 
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generate more private information in response to low earnings quality. My next hypotheses tests 
the association between analyst forecast dispersion and market-based uncertainty measure in 
subsamples with different level of earnings quality to provide a stronger test of the information 
content of analyst forecast dispersion. Its goal is to clearly identify whether analyst forecast 
dispersion shows a stronger negative correlation with investors’ uncertainty toward earnings in 
subsample firms with low earnings quality where analysts have more incentives to acquire 
private information. If analyst forecast dispersion indeed proxy for information asymmetry 
among analysts, the negative correlation should be intensified in sub-sample firms with low 
earnings quality. Otherwise, if analyst forecast dispersion is simply a proxy of uncertainty, I do 
not expect any moderating effect from earnings quality. Based on the empirical support of H1b, I 
further hypothesize that  
H2: The negative association between analyst forecast dispersion and investors’ perceived 
uncertainty toward an earnings announcement is more pronounced when earnings quality is low. 
Figure 2 visually illustrates hypothesis 2. It shows that when earnings quality is low, both 
the average market uncertainty toward earnings announcement and analyst forecast dispersion 
increases. However, the negative correlation (the slope effect) between market uncertainty and 
analyst forecast dispersion becomes more pronounced.  
Aside from the cross-sectional relationship presented above, how the inter-temporal 
change in earnings quality affect the association between analyst forecast dispersion and 
investors’ uncertainty toward earnings provides an alternative test of the fundamental 
information contained in analyst forecast dispersion. Since it is difficult to estimate the inter-
temporal change of earnings quality using traditional earnings quality measures which generally 
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requires a long time series of data to estimate, I resort to restatement announcement as a proxy 
for perceived decrease in earnings quality. Prior literature show evidence that accounting 
restatement reduces perceived earnings quality. Kravet and Shevlin (2010) document that firms 
that have recently experienced accounting restatement have a higher information risk. Kim and 
Zhang (2013) argue that such firms’ stock face a higher risk of crashing. Wilson (2005) and 
Chen et al. (2013) both illustrate that restating firms have a lower ERC after accounting 
restatement announcement. Hribar and Jenkins (2004) display a higher cost of equity after 
restatement announcement. Based on these researches, I use accounting restatement as a proxy 
for a sudden decrease in earnings quality and hypothesize that:  
H3: The negative association between analyst forecast dispersion and investors’ perceived 
uncertainty toward an earnings announcement is more pronounced after accounting restatement  
 Similarly, Figure 3 visually displays the effect that restatement can have on the relation 
between analyst forecast dispersion and investors’ perceived uncertainty toward earnings.  
 
3.2 Research Design 
I use the following empirical model to test H1:  
DIV = α + β1*DISP + β2*EQ + β3*Macro Economic Control+ β4*Firm-specific Control 
+Fixed Effects + ε  
The dependent variable is the 30-day change in implied volatility prior to an earnings 
announcement and is called DIV here after. DISP is the standard deviation of most updated 
individual analyst forecast deflated by the prior quarter’s end price. EQ is the measure of 
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earnings quality. Following prior literature, I use a combination of four different earnings-quality 
measures to test my hypotheses. Specifically, I use a modified Jones model measure of accrual 
quality (MJones), performance-matched modified Jones model accrual  (MJonesPM) (Kothari et 
al. 2005), and earnings smoothness defined as the ratio of earnings volatility over operating cash 
flow volatility of the past five fiscal years (Smooth) (Leuz et al. 2003), and cash flow volatility 
(CVol). Following Francis et al. (2004), I investigate the relation that a group of earnings quality 
measures has with market uncertainty and the ways in which they interact with analyst forecast 
dispersion to enhance the validity of the results. The independent variable of interest, analysts 
forecast dispersion, includes only the most updated quarterly earnings forecast issued in between 
T-31 and T-1 to match the estimation period of the dependent variable. The macroeconomic 
control variable is the change in the VIX index over the same period covered by the dependent 
variable. The firm-specific control variables include a set of firm characteristic variables related 
to firm’s risk profile such as leverage (Leverage), return on asset (ROA), size as measured by log 
market value of equity (LMV), and book-to-market ratio (BTM).  
To test H2, I create subsamples using earnings-quality measures as partition variables and 
test whether the coefficient on DISP differs between subsamples.  To test H3, I add a dummy 
interaction variable, RES, which is set to 1 to represent firm-quarters after restatement and set to 
0 to represent firm-quarters prior to restatement. The empirical models used to test h2 and h3 are 
structurally similar to the model used to test H1.  
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CHAPTER 4 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.1 Sample selection 
Following prior literature, I obtain information about implied volatility from the 
OptionMetrics database’s standardized options dataset. Implied volatility is standardized in this 
database so that they represent as-if at-the-money option’s implied volatility with a standardized 
expiration date. Because I focus on short-term change in implied volatility before earnings 
announcement, I choose the standard option contract with the shortest expiration, which is 30 
days (see footnote 3 for detailed standardization process). The standardized option database 
provides comparable implied volatility across different firms since they all represent at-the-
money option’s implied volatility with same time to expiration at the date of observation. To 
obtain analyst earnings forecast information, I collect quarterly analyst forecast information from 
the IBES detailed database for fiscal years 1996–2011. My sample starts in 1996 because that is 
when the OptionMetrics database began covering option contracts. The financial information for 
particular companies is collected using the Compustat database. My primary sample contains 
113,108 firm quarters with non-missing variables to test the relation between market uncertainty 
and analyst forecast dispersion. I also utilize a restricted sample with only fourth-quarter 
observations, which reduces the sample size to 29,507 firm quarters.  
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
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I start with firms that have enough information to calculate my dependent variable 
(change of implied volatility of 30-day standardized call option contracts) from the 
OptionMetrics database. Because OptionMetrics database begins coverage in 1996, I restrict my 
sample period to 1996–2011. Measures for annual earnings are more widely used and can be 
more accurately estimated than those for quarterly earnings; thus, I restrict further tests related to 
earnings quality to a sample that uses only fourth-quarter data to match annual earnings quality 
measures. Figure 4 shows the average percentage change in implied volatility for 20 days around 
an earnings announcement during the fourth quarter. Day zero is set as the day of the earnings 
announcement, and the implied volatility of day zero is used as the benchmark to calculate 
implied volatility change. Consistent with prior literature (Ederington and Lee 1996), the change 
in implied volatility shows a distinctive pattern: it reaches a local maximum one trading day 
prior to the earnings announcement and decreases sharply after the announcement to revert to 
normal volatility. Figure 4 also indicates that on average, implied volatility decreases to a level 
lower than it was immediately before the earnings announcement. Figure 5 shows the daily 
change in implied volatility for an extended period of time (40 days prior to the earnings 
announcement). This chart presents a clear pattern: implied volatility begins to increase 30 days 
before the announcement. This is consistent with Donders and Vosrt (1996)’s model of implied 
volatility during event days (earnings announcement) and non-event days. As the announcement 
date approaches, the high volatility receives a heavier weight in the time-weighted model. Figure 
6 and figure 7 show the daily change in implied volatility based on the earnings announcement 
news type. To produce the information in these figures, I divide the full sample into positive 
news (firms with positive earnings surprise compared to consensus analyst forecast), negative 
news (firms with negative earnings surprise compared to consensus analyst forecast), and 
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confirming news (firms with the same actual earnings surprise as the consensus analyst forecast). 
Figure 6 shows the change in implied volatility using the announcement day implied volatility as 
the benchmark volatility, while Figure 7 shows the same change using t-30 day implied volatility 
as the benchmark volatility. These figures locate 75,960 announcements of positive earnings 
surprise, 55,526 negative earnings surprise, and 15,387 announcements that confirm consensus 
forecast. The charts illustrate that all three subsamples exhibit a similar increase in implied 
volatility regardless of the news type. However, the bad news subsample reveals the least change 
in implied volatility around earnings announcements, while the good news subsample increases 
the most. A logical explanation for this phenomenon would be that firms that eventually issue a 
negative earnings surprise have a higher baseline level of uncertainty. The implied volatility of 
the good news sample decreases to a level much lower than those related to bad news and 
confirming news. The confirming news and bad news subsamples experience longer drift of 
implied volatility until it reverts to its long-term average as opposed to the instant correction in 
the good news subsample. Figure 8 plots the change of implied volatility using the actual level of 
implied volatility at t-30 as benchmark volatility. It confirms that the bad news sample contains 
firms with a much higher baseline (normal) implied volatility than the good news and confirming 
news sub-samples. One caveat in this discussion is that this simple sub-sample analysis based on 
news types does not account for the magnitude of particular news.  
Table 1 Panel A shows the number of firm quarters in my sample space and the 
descriptive statistics of quarterly variables. The distribution for the number of firms remains even 
across the years, while the mean change in implied volatility (DIV) prior to an earnings 
announcement is 9.2%, with a median of 12.9%.  Table 1 Panel B shows the annual (fourth 
quarter) sample distribution across years and the descriptive statistics of regression variables. 
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The implied volatility change (DIV) measure exhibits a positive average of approximately 7.0%. 
This finding indicates that the implied volatility increases by as much as 7% during the last 
trading days prior to the earnings announcement, as compared to the implied volatility present on 
a normal day without an earnings announcement.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Testing H1 
The results of the empirical test for hypothesis 1 are summarized in Table 2. The change 
in implied volatility prior to an earnings announcement is negatively (and significantly) 
correlated with analyst forecast dispersion. This result contradicts the traditional belief that 
analyst forecast dispersion represents uncertainty (H1a) and favors the competing hypothesis that 
analyst forecast dispersion represents information asymmetry among analysts (H1b). Both the 
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients have a significantly negative coefficient. 
Therefore, H1a is rejected in the statistical test and H1b is supported.  
Panel B of Table 2 shows the univariate regression results of analyst forecast dispersion 
on the change in implied volatility prior to an earnings announcement for both the quarterly and 
the fourth quarter–only sample. I include only the industry-fixed effect and year-fixed effect as 
control variables. All standards errors are clustered by firms. The results confirm that analyst 
forecast dispersion is negatively correlated with implied volatility change. For the quarterly 
sample, the coefficient on DISP is -0.950, with a t-statistic of -5.60. For the annual sample, the 
coefficient on DISP is -1.661, with a t-statistic of -5.14.  
Panel C augments the regression model in Panel B with a set of control variables related 
to a firm’s uncertainty prior to an earnings announcement. I include change in the same period’s 
VIX index as independent variable to control for market-level macro-economic change. I also 
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include log market value (LMV) to control for firm size, book-to-market ratio (BTM) to control 
for growth opportunities, leverage (Leverage) to control for financial risk, and return on asset 
(ROA) to control for profitability. After the inclusion of these control variables, the coefficient 
on dispersion remains significantly negative. For the quarterly sample, the coefficient is -0.471, 
with a t-statistic of -2.75. For the annual sample, the coefficient is -0.905, with a t-statistic of -
2.85.  
In this research, the statistical test presents strong support for a private information 
acquisition driven analyst forecast dispersion. The higher the analyst forecast dispersion, the 
lower the market-perceived uncertainty toward upcoming earnings announcements. A 
contradictory result in prior literature can be mostly attributed to the use of a novel dependent 
variable in this paper, which measures ex ante uncertainty regarding upcoming earnings 
announcements instead of coincident uncertainty.   
 
5.2 Testing H2 
 Table 3 shows the main effect of earnings quality on investors’ perceived uncertainty 
toward earnings announcement. For all but earnings smoothness proxy, they are all significantly 
positively correlated with DIV. Table 3 Panel B shows that the inclusion of earnings quality 
proxy in the multi-variable regression does not affect the sign and significance of other variables 
of interest.  
To test H2, I uses various measures of earnings quality to partition the sample into 
subsamples according to the quality of their earnings. Table 4 shows the regression results using 
two different measures of earnings quality in four columns. The results support H2, and an F-test 
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shows that the coefficient of interest is significantly lower for subsamples with low-quality 
earnings than it is for those with high-quality earnings. Based on these results, analyst forecast 
dispersion’s negative correlation with market uncertainty is more pronounced when earnings 
quality is low where analysts have a much stronger incentive to acquire private information to 
compensate for the low quality public information. This result provides further verification that 
the negative correlation between analyst forecast dispersion and investor’s perceived uncertainty 
is driven by the information asymmetry among analysts rather than uncertainty toward earnings.  
 
5.3 Testing H3 
 In additional to the cross-sectional analysis using proxies for earnings quality, I also 
propose and test the impact of restatement on the relationship between analyst forecast 
dispersion and investors’ perceived uncertainty toward an earnings announcement. To perform 
this test, I create a subsample with accounting restatement announcement and then keep only the 
quarters containing restatement announcement and the fiscal quarter prior to restatement 
announcement as a control subsample. I then plot the change in implied volatility for the quarter 
before the restatement announcement, the quarter of the restatement announcement, and the 
quarter after the restatement announcement in Figure 9. The restatement quarter shows the 
highest benchmark level of implied volatility, which suggests that the restatement announcement 
provokes a higher level of uncertainty (0.488, on average). Although the post-restatement quarter 
has a lower benchmark level of uncertainty (0.475, on average), it contains the largest increase in 
market uncertainty prior to an earnings announcement. To further test the impact of restatement, 
I create a sample containing only the firm quarter that announces the restatement and the quarter 
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immediately before the announcement. The latter serves as a self-control sample, and it contains 
1,100 restatement announcements, with non-missing values for all regression variables. This 
produces a total sample size of 2,200. I create a dummy variable, RES, which is set to 1 if the 
quarter has a restatement announcement prior to its fiscal quarter ends. Table 5 shows the 
regression results. The main effect of dispersion is marginally positive but with very small 
coefficient indicating a low economic significance. However, the interaction of restatement and 
dispersion is significantly negative with a largely negative coefficient, which indicates that when 
earnings quality decreases, analyst forecast dispersion becomes significantly negatively 
correlated with market uncertainty. This is consistent with the previous cross-sectional regression 
analysis.  
 In summary, the empirical support of H2 and H3 confirms that the negative relationship 
between analyst forecast dispersion and investors’ perceived uncertainty is concentrated in 
subsamples with low earnings quality where analysts have more incentives to acquire private 
information to compensate for low quality public information.  
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CHAPTER 6 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 In the previous section, I document a negative correlation between analyst forecast 
dispersion and investors uncertainty toward earnings announcement. To further interpret my 
results and reconcile my findings with prior literature, I decompose analyst forecast dispersion 
according to Barron et al. (1998) into uncertainty and information asymmetry components. I 
rerun the regression in Table 4 using decomposed uncertainty and information asymmetry 
proxies. In untabulated results, the information asymmetry portion is significantly negatively 
correlated with DIV (correlation coefficient = -0.04 p<0.001) while the uncertainty portion is 
significantly positively correlated with DIV (correlation coefficient = 0.01 P<0.001). This result 
is consistent with my hypothesis that the negative correlation is driven by information 
asymmetry among analysts rather than uncertainty. This result also provides further empirical 
support for Barron et al. (1998)’s theoretically decomposition of analyst forecast dispersion.  
To reconcile my results with prior research, I also test the correlation between analyst 
forecast dispersion and the current quarter’s idiosyncratic risk. I find a significantly positive 
correlation (correlation coefficient 0.24), and the decomposed information asymmetry portion 
correlates positively with current quarter idiosyncratic risk (correlation coefficient 0.10). This 
finding is consistent with the prediction of Abarbanell et al. (1995) who predicts a positive 
correlation between analyst forecast dispersion and concurrent stock price volatility. Despite 
such findings, my dependent variable is a forward-looking measure, which focuses on the 
incremental price variance that an investor expects around an upcoming earnings announcement 
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rather than concurrently with the issuance of analyst forecast dispersion. The negative correlation 
is consistent with Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994) prediction. In fact, in further empirical tests, my 
dependent variable correlates significantly with the next quarter’s idiosyncratic risk (correlation 
coefficient 0.18), though it does not correlate with the current quarter idiosyncratic risk 
(correlation coefficient 0.002 and not significant). In summary, the negative correlation I find is 
mostly attributable to my use of a market based forward-looking measure of future uncertainty 
that captures different constructs from traditional uncertainty measures such as idiosyncratic risk.  
Prior research also documents other variables that serve as proxies for “divergence of 
investors’ opinion” (Garfinkel 2009). I test the correlation between my dependent variable (DIV) 
and proxies of divergence of investors’ opinion in the concurrent and future quarters, and I find 
that DIV is significantly correlated with proxies related to the divergence of investors’ opinion in 
future quarters (these measures include standardized unexplained volume, idiosyncratic volatility, 
bid-ask spread, and annual analyst forecast dispersion). Furthermore, DIV is not correlated with 
current quarter’s investors’ opinion divergence variables. This further validates my dependent 
variable as a forward-looking proxy for investors’ perceived uncertainty toward upcoming 
earnings announcement.  
To reduce the concern of endogeneity4 where analyst forecast dispersion and investors 
uncertainty toward earnings are simultaneously affected by firm characteristics, I decompose 
analyst forecast dispersion based on dispersion affected by innate firm characteristics and the 
                                                          
4 There are also concerns about endogeneity rising from the self-selection issue related to option 
listing. However, unlike a firm’s decision to pursue an IPO, the decision to be listed on the 
option exchange is not voluntary. The options exchange makes such decision based on market 
demand to trade particular firm’s options contracts. (Mayhew and Mihov 2004). With this 
information, it should not raise concern in regards to self-selection bias that I use only optioned 
firms.   
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residual that is orthogonal to these characteristics. Table 6 shows the two stage regression results. 
Table 6 Panel A shows the first stage regression, the residual from the first stage regression is 
used as a proxy of analyst forecast dispersion orthogonal to firm characteristics. Table 6 Panel B 
illustrates the second stage regression. The residual from first stage regression is still 
significantly negatively correlated with DIV indicating that the main results is not simply driven 
by firm characteristics.  
Following Hennes et al. (2008), I also construct a sample that includes only incidents of 
restatements classified as irregularities in the sample to filter out unintentional error induced 
restatements. The untabulated results are qualitatively similar to the full sample of restatement 
incidents.  
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  In this study, I investigate the association between analyst forecast dispersion and 
investors’ perceived uncertainty toward earnings announcement, and I locate a negative 
correlation between the two variables. Higher analyst forecast dispersion has long been viewed 
to represent firm-specific risk. I show that analyst forecast dispersion on average represents the 
information asymmetry among analysts rather than uncertainty. Further investigation shows that 
this relationship is concentrated in subsample firms with low earnings quality where analysts 
have stronger incentives to acquire private information. Additional empirical evidence confirms 
that my results are robust to Barron et al. (1998)’s decomposition process.   
 This study contributes to the literature by furthering our understanding of the role 
analysts play in the capital market, including the ways in which they gather and produce 
information, along with their incentives for so doing. The results indicate that analysts supply 
additional private information to market when facing noisy signals and their information reduces 
investors’ uncertainty toward upcoming earnings announcement. My empirical results suggest 
that the decomposition of analyst forecast dispersion constructed by Barron et al. (1998) provides 
a more precise interpretation of results related to analyst forecast dispersion. I also propose and 
validate a new dependent variable obtained directly from options market that isolates the market 
expected uncertainty towards upcoming earnings announcement only. Future research can 
further investigate the information content and market consequences of the cross-sectional 
difference of investors’ uncertainty toward earnings announcement.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1: Timeline of earnings announcement  
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Figure 2: Hypothesis 2  
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Figure 3: Hypothesis 3 
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Figure 4: Daily change of implied volatility around earnings announcement 
 
Figure 4 plots the percentage change of implied volatility 10 trading days before and after earnings announcement. 
The sample has 146,863 firm-quarters from 1996 to 2011. Earnings announcement day implied volatility is used as 
the benchmark implied volatility and is set to zero. If earnings announcement day is not a trading day, the next 
trading day is used as day 0.  
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Figure 5: Daily change of implied volatility around earnings announcement for an extended 
period prior to earnings announcement 
 
Figure 5 plots the percentage change of implied volatility around earnings announcement. The sample has 146,863 
firm-quarters from 1996 to 2011. Earnings announcement day implied volatility is used as the benchmark implied 
volatility and is set to zero. If earnings announcement day is not a trading day, the next trading day is used as day 0.  
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Figure 6: Daily change of implied volatility around earnings announcement for an extended 
period prior to earnings announcement by news type 
 
Figure 6 plots the percentage change of implied volatility around earnings announcement. The sample has 146,863 
firm-quarters from 1996 to 2010. Earnings announcement day implied volatility is used as the benchmark implied 
volatility and is set to zero. If earnings announcement day is not a trading day, the next trading day is used as day 0. 
There is a total of 75,950 good news announcements, 55,526 bad news, and 15, 387 confirming news respectively in 
the sample period.  
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Figure 7: Daily change of implied volatility around earnings announcement for an extended 
period prior to earnings announcement by news type 
 
 
Figure 7 plots the percentage change of implied volatility around earnings announcement. The sample has 146,863 
firm-quarters from 1996 to 2011. The implied volatility 30 days prior to earnings announcement day is used as the 
benchmark implied volatility and is set to zero. If earnings announcement day is not a trading day, the next trading 
day is used as day 0. There is a total of 75,950 good news announcements, 55,526 bad news, and 15, 387 confirming 
news respectively in the sample period.  
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Figure 8: Daily change of implied volatility around earnings announcement for an extended 
period prior to earnings announcement by news type 
 
Figure 8 plots the percentage change of implied volatility around earnings announcement. The sample has 146,863 
firm-quarters from 1996 to 2011. The implied volatility 30 days prior to earnings announcement day is used as the 
benchmark implied volatility. If earnings announcement day is not a trading day, the next trading day is used as day 
0. There is a total of 75,950 good news announcements, 55,526 bad news, and 15, 387 confirming news respectively 
in the sample period.  
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Figure 9: Daily change of implied volatility around earnings announcement prior to, 
during, and post restatement announcement quarter 
 
Figure 9 plots the percentage change of implied volatility around earnings announcement. The sample has 3,300 
firm-quarters (1,100 restatements announcements) from 1996 to 2011. The implied volatility 30 days prior to 
earnings announcement day is used as the benchmark implied volatility. If earnings announcement day is not a 
trading day, the next trading day is used as day 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.47
0.48
0.49
0.5
0.51
0.52
0.53
0.54
0.55
- 3 5 - 3 0 - 2 5 - 2 0 - 1 5 - 1 0 - 5 0 5 1 0 1 5
IMPLIED VOLATILITY CHANGE 
PRE- DURING- AND POST- RESTATEMENT 
QUARTER
pre-res res Post-Res
 41 
 
Table 1: Sample distribution 
 
Panel A: Quarterly sample size by calendar year 
Calendar Year Number of firm quarters Percent (%) 
1996 5,295 4.68 
1997 6,406 5.66 
1998 7,132 6.31 
1999 7,175 6.34 
2000 6,346 5.61 
2001 6,067 5.36 
2002 6,336 5.60 
2003 6,169 5.45 
2004 6,799 6.01 
2005 7,264 6.42 
2006 7,690 6.80 
2007 8,256 7.30 
2008 8,335 7.37 
2009 8,308 7.35 
2010 8,478 7.50 
2011 7,052 6.23 
Total 113,108 100.00% 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. 25% Median 75% N 
IV 0.092 0.327 -0.139 0.129 0.283 113,108 
VIX 0.002 0.066 -0.028 -0.004 0.021 113,108 
LMV 7.409 1.526 6.302 7.258 8.359 113,108 
BTM 0.485 0.389 0.238 0.404 0.635 113,108 
Leverage 0.223 0.204 0.032 0.194 0.345 113,108 
ROA 0.005 0.041 0.001 0.011 0.023 113,108 
DISP 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.002 113,108 
       
This table presents the quarterly sample size distribution by year and the descriptive statistics of the variables used 
in the regression analysis. The sample contains firm quarters from 1996 to 2011. IV is the 30 day change of implied 
volatility of option contract expiring in 30 days prior to earnings announcement as defined in hypothesis 
development section. VIX is the change of VIX index during the same period as IV. LMV is the log market value of 
equity. BTM is the book to market ratio. Leverage represents the debt to equity ratio. ROA is the return on asset. 
DISP is the analyst forecast dispersion deflated by prior quarter end price. All variables are calculated using end of 
quarter financial data and are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42 
 
Table 1 (cont.) 
 
Panel B: Annual sample size by calendar year 
Calendar Year Number of firm years Percent (%) 
1996 1,488 5.05 
1997 1,820 6.18 
1998 1,960 6.65 
1999 1,892 6.42 
2000 1,662 5.64 
2001 1,663 5.65 
2002 1,657 5.63 
2003 1,657 5.63 
2004 1,831 6.22 
2005 1,971 6.69 
2006 2,140 7.27 
2007 2,213 7.51 
2008 2,137 7.25 
2009 2,210 7.50 
2010 2,251 7.64 
2011 904 3.07 
Total 113,277 100.00% 
 
Variable Mean Std. 25% Median 75% N 
IV 0.070 0.321 -0.151 0.117 0.264 29.507 
VIX 0.002 0.049 -0.019 0.000 0.023 29,507 
LMV 7.426 1.536 6.310 7.270 8.377 29,507 
BTM 0.484 0.383 0.238 0.405 0.634 29,507 
Leverage 0.223 0.205 0.032 0.192 0.346 29,507 
ROA 0.003 0.048 0.000 0.010 0.024 29,507 
DISP 0.003 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.002 29,456 
MJones 0.067 0.079 0.019 0.043 0.083 27,023 
MJonesPM 0.104 0.117 0.028 0.065 0.135 26,471 
SMOOTH 1.258 1.441 0.514 0.877 1.417 26,096 
CVOL 0.062 0.078 0.023 0.041 0.071 26,103 
       
This table presents the annual sample size distribution by year and the descriptive statistics of the variables used in 
the regression analysis. The sample contains firm years from 1996 to 2011. IV is the 30 day change of implied 
volatility of option contract expiring in 30 days prior to earnings announcement as defined in hypothesis 
development section. VIX is the change of VIX index during the same period as IV. LMV is the log market value of 
equity. BTM is the book to market ratio. Leverage represents the debt to equity ratio. ROA is the return on asset. 
DISP is the analyst forecast dispersion deflated by prior quarter end price. Mjones is the modified Jones measure of 
accrual quality. MJonesPM is the performance matched modified Jones measure. Smooth is the ratio of earnings 
volatility over cash flow volatility for the past 5 fiscal years. CVOL is the cash flow volatility of the past 5 fiscal 
years. All variables are calculated using end of fiscal year financial data and are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
 
Table 2 Regression results on the relation between analyst forecast dispersion and market 
uncertainty 
 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix 
  
 IV DISP 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
IV 
 
      -0.032*** 
 
 
  
DISP      -0.032*** 
  
   
   Panel A presents the Pearson (upper right corner) and Spearman correlation (lower left corner) between market 
uncertainty and analyst forecast dispersion. The sample contains firm quarters from 1996 to 2011. IV is the 30 day 
change of implied volatility of option contract expiring in 30 days prior to earnings announcement as defined in 
hypothesis development section. DISP is the analyst forecast dispersion deflated by prior quarter end price. All 
variables are calculated using end of fiscal quarter financial data and are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. 
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Table 2 (cont.) 
 
Panel B: Univariate analysis 
 Dependent variable = IV 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
DISP       -0.950*** 
(-5.60) 
      -1.661*** 
(-5.14) 
 
  
Intercept        0.036*** 
(2.82) 
    0.025 
(1.09) 
Sample  Quarterly 4th Quarter 
Industry fixed effect Included Included 
Year fixed effect Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.041 
Number of Observations 112,325 29,399 
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Table 2 (cont.) 
 
Panel C: Multi-variable regression analysis 
Dependent variable = DIV30  
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
VIX       1.738*** 
(97.36) 
      1.821*** 
(41.47) 
LMV      0.002*** 
(2.26) 
     0.003** 
(2.35) 
BTM       -0.023*** 
(-5.55) 
      -0.026*** 
(-3.29) 
Leverage  -0.031*** 
(-4.88) 
 -0.034*** 
(-2.88) 
ROA     0.140*** 
(3.74) 
    0.230*** 
(3.61) 
DISP    -0.471*** 
(-2.75) 
   -0.905*** 
(-2.85) 
Intercept    0.072*** 
(5.01) 
 0.057** 
(2.10) 
   
Sample  Quarterly 4th Quarter 
Industry fixed effect Included Included 
Year fixed effect Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.114 
Number of Observations 112,325 29,248 
   
Panel B and Panel C present the univariate and multi-variate regression analysis for the impact of analyst forecast 
dispersion on market uncertainty change. The sample contains firm quarter and firm years from 1996 to 2011. IV is 
the 30 day change of implied volatility of option contract expiring in 30 days prior to earnings announcement as 
defined in hypothesis development section. VIX is the change of VIX index during the same period as IV. LMV is 
the log market value of equity. BTM is the book to market ratio. Leverage represents the debt to equity ratio. ROA 
is the return on asset. DISP is the analyst forecast dispersion deflated by prior quarter end price. All variables are 
calculated using end of fiscal year financial data and are winsorized at top and bottom 1%.When estimating the 
coefficients’ standard errors, we use a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years of a 
given firm. ***, **, and * indicate p-value at the <0.01, <0.05, and <0.10 level based on two-tailed t-tests. 
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Table 3: Regression results on the effect of earnings quality on market uncertainty 
 
Panel A: Univariate results 
  
 IV IV 
 Coefficient 
(Pearson) 
Coefficient 
(Spearman) 
MJones       0.013*** 
 
      0.023*** 
 
MJonesPM       0.010*** 
 
      0.018*** 
 
Smooth     0.003 
 
      0.022*** 
 
Cvol       0.033*** 
 
      0.056*** 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
 
Panel B: Multi-variate regression results 
Dependent variable = DIV30    
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
VIX       1.890*** 
(47.43) 
      1.881*** 
(46.52) 
      1.844*** 
(47.42) 
      1.843*** 
(47.41) 
LMV   0.002* 
(1.78) 
  0.002 
(1.24) 
  0.002 
(1.12) 
  0.002 
(1.59) 
BTM       -0.025*** 
(-4.52) 
      -0.029*** 
(-5.12) 
      -0.028*** 
(-5.00) 
      -0.026*** 
(-4.57) 
Leverage  -0.029** 
(-2.83) 
 -0.031*** 
(-2.98) 
 -0.037*** 
(-3.64) 
 -0.035*** 
(-3.44) 
ROA     0.275*** 
(6.33) 
    0.263*** 
(6.00) 
    0.189*** 
(4.21) 
    0.208*** 
(4.67) 
DISP  -0.995*** 
(-4.82) 
 -1.019*** 
(-4.88) 
 -0.855*** 
(-4.22) 
 -0.904*** 
(-4.44) 
MJones    0.073*** 
(2.90)  
  
MJonesPM 
 
   0.003*** 
(2.83) 
  
Smooth 
  
 -0.002 
(-1.13) 
 
CVol 
  
    0.049* 
(1.81) 
Intercept 0.068** 
(2.22) 
0.078*** 
(2.52) 
0.080** 
(2.68) 
0.070** 
(2.31) 
     
Sample  4th Quarter 4th Quarter 4th Quarter 4th Quarter 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.117 0.122 0.122 
Number of Observations 26,776 26,224 25,894 25,901 
     
This table presents the univariate and multi-variate regression analysis for the impact of analyst forecast dispersion 
and earnings quality on market uncertainty change. The sample contains firm quarter and firm years from 1996 to 
2011. IV is the 30 day change of implied volatility of option contract expiring in 30 days prior to earnings 
announcement as defined in hypothesis development section. VIX is the change of VIX index during the same 
period as IV. LMV is the log market value of equity. BTM is the book to market ratio. Leverage represents the debt 
to equity ratio. ROA is the return on asset. DISP is the analyst forecast dispersion deflated by prior quarter end price. 
Mjones is the modified Jones measure of accrual quality. MJonesPM is the performance matched modified Jones 
measure. Smooth is the ratio of earnings volatility over cash flow volatility for the past 5 fiscal years. CVOL is the 
cash flow volatility of the past 5 fiscal years. All variables are calculated using end of fiscal year financial data and 
are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. When estimating the coefficients’ standard errors, we use a clustering 
procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years of a given firm. ***, **, and * indicate p-value at the 
<0.01, <0.05, and <0.10 level based on two-tailed t-tests. 
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Table 4: Regression Results on the moderating effect of earnings quality 
 
Dependent variable = DIV30 MJonesPM  Smooth 
 Low Earnings 
Quality 
High Earnings 
Quality 
Low Earnings 
Quality 
High Earnings 
Quality 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
VIX       1.996*** 
(28.16) 
      1.822*** 
(38.79) 
      2.044*** 
(29.68) 
      1.765*** 
(35.83) 
LMV   0.004 
(1.47) 
  0.002 
(1.18) 
  0.005 
(1.03) 
   0.000 
(0.07) 
BTM       -0.033*** 
(-3.35) 
      -0.019** 
(-2.79) 
      -0.041*** 
(-4.16) 
      -0.019*** 
(-2.78) 
Leverage  -0.031* 
(-1.77) 
 -0.027** 
(-2.14) 
 -0.045** 
(-2.60) 
 -0.022** 
(-1.69) 
ROA     0.191*** 
(3.22) 
    0.431*** 
(6.05) 
    0.234*** 
(3.90) 
    0.279*** 
(4.02) 
DISP  -1.381*** 
(-4.53) 
 -0.421 
(-1.45) 
 -0.874*** 
(-4.89) 
 -0.462 
(-1.07) 
Intercept 0.045 
(0.64) 
0.073** 
(2.18) 
0.085 
(1.12) 
0.080** 
(2.39) 
     
Sample  4th Quarter 4th Quarter 4th Quarter 4th Quarter 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.132 0.123 0.120 
Number of Observations 10,603 10,103 10,449 10,775 
F-test p<0.001  p<0.001  
     
This table presents the univariate and multi-variate regression analysis for the impact of analyst forecast dispersion 
and earnings quality on market uncertainty change. The sample contains firm quarter and firm years from 1996 to 
2011. IV is the 30 day change of implied volatility of option contract expiring in 30 days prior to earnings 
announcement as defined in hypothesis development section. VIX is the change of VIX index during the same 
period as IV. LMV is the log market value of equity. BTM is the book to market ratio. Leverage represents the debt 
to equity ratio. ROA is the return on asset. DISP is the analyst forecast dispersion deflated by prior quarter end price. 
Mjones is the modified Jones measure of accrual quality. MJonesPM is the performance matched modified Jones 
measure. Smooth is the ratio of earnings volatility over cash flow volatility for the past 5 fiscal years. CVOL is the 
cash flow volatility of the past 5 fiscal years. All variables are calculated using end of fiscal year financial data and 
are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. When estimating the coefficients’ standard errors, we use a clustering 
procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years of a given firm. ***, **, and * indicate p-value at the 
<0.01, <0.05, and <0.10 level based on two-tailed t-tests. 
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Table 5: Regression Results on the effect of restatement 
 
Dependent variable = DIV30    
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic)    
VIX       2.02*** 
(20.87)    
LMV   -0.002 
(-0.42)    
BTM       -0.041*** 
(-2.81)    
Leverage  -0.028 
(-1.05)    
ROA     0.323*** 
(2.47)    
RES  0.011 
(0.87)    
DISP   0.158* 
(1.94)  
  
RES*DISP    -2.539** 
(-2.11)  
  
Intercept 0.130** 
(3.85)  
  
     
     
Industry fixed effect Included    
Year fixed effect Included    
Adjusted R2 0.140    
Number of Observations 2,200    
     
This table presents the regression analysis for the impact of analyst forecast dispersion and accounting restatement 
on market uncertainty change. The sample contains firm quarter with restatement announcement 1996 to 2011 as 
well as firm quarters one quarter prior to restatement announcement. IV is the 30 day change of implied volatility of 
option contract expiring in 30 days prior to earnings announcement as defined in hypothesis development section. 
VIX is the change of VIX index during the same period as IV. LMV is the log market value of equity. BTM is the 
book to market ratio. Leverage represents the debt to equity ratio. ROA is the return on asset. DISP is the analyst 
forecast dispersion deflated by prior quarter end price. RES is an indicator variable representing the existence of 
restatement in the current quarter. All variables are calculated using end of fiscal year financial data and are 
winsorized at top and bottom 1%. When estimating the coefficients’ standard errors, we use a clustering procedure 
that accounts for serial dependence across years of a given firm. ***, **, and * indicate p-value at the <0.01, <0.05, 
and <0.10 level based on two-tailed t-tests.  
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Table 6: Analysts’ private information search 
 
Panel A: first stage regression  
Dependent variable = Analyst Forecast Dispersion    
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic)    
TA       -0.001*** 
(-18.06)    
NA   0.000*** 
(6.72)    
ROE       -0.040*** 
(-27.07)    
Leverage  0.005*** 
(17.01)    
SG     0.001* 
(1.88)    
EVol  0.012*** 
(13.02)    
Intercept 0.007*** 
(20.24)  
  
 
  
  
     
Sample  4th Quarter    
Industry fixed effect N/A    
Year fixed effect N/A    
Adjusted R2 0.120    
Number of Observations 26,776    
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Table 6 (cont.) 
 
Panel B: Second stage regression 
Dependent variable = DIV30    
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic)  
VIX       1.890*** 
(47.51) 
      1.976*** 
(44.75) 
      1.974*** 
(44.74)  
LMV   0.003** 
(2.34) 
  0.001 
(0.57) 
  -0.001 
(-0.55)  
BTM       -0.028*** 
(-4.90) 
      -0.035*** 
(-5.26) 
      -0.037*** 
(-5.58)  
Leverage  -0.033** 
(-3.16) 
 -0.043*** 
(-3.52) 
 -0.030* 
(-1.75)  
ROA     0.310*** 
(7.24) 
    0.258*** 
(5.00) 
    0.127*** 
(1.08)  
Residual 
 
 -0.597* 
(-1.71)   
MJonesPM      0.062*** 
(3.00) 
   -0.016* 
(-0.79) 
  
MJonesPM*Residual 
 
   -4.573*** 
(-3.00) 
  
MJonesPM 
  
  
MJonesPM*Predict 
  
 0.043 
(0.01) 
 
Predict 
  
 -0.019 
(-0.66) 
 
Intercept 0.063** 
(2.06) 
0.073*** 
(2.10) 
0.099** 
(2.43) 
 
     
Sample  4th Quarter 4th Quarter 4th Quarter  
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included  
Year fixed effect Included Included Included  
Adjusted R2 0.138 0.151 0.140  
Number of Observations 17,824 17,824 17,824  
     
This table presents the regression analysis for the impact of analyst forecast dispersion and earnings quality on 
market uncertainty change. The sample contains firm quarter and firm years from 1996 to 2011. TA is log total 
assets of the firm. NA is number of analysts. ROE is return on equity. SG is sales growth. Evol is the earnings 
volatility. IV is the 30 day change of implied volatility of option contract expiring in 30 days prior to earnings 
announcement as defined in hypothesis development section. VIX is the change of VIX index during the same 
period as IV. LMV is the log market value of equity. BTM is the book to market ratio. Leverage represents the debt 
to equity ratio. ROA is the return on asset. DISP is the analyst forecast dispersion deflated by prior quarter end price. 
Mjones is the modified Jones measure of accrual quality. MJonesPM is the performance matched modified Jones 
measure. Smooth is the ratio of earnings volatility over cash flow volatility for the past 5 fiscal years. CVOL is the 
cash flow volatility of the past 5 fiscal years. All variables are calculated using end of fiscal year financial data and 
are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. When estimating the coefficients’ standard errors, we use a clustering 
procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years of a given firm. ***, **, and * indicate p-value at the 
<0.01, <0.05, and <0.10 level based on two-tailed t-tests. 
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL RELATED PROPOSAL 
 An additional research proposal that investigates whether option traders detect accounting 
misreporting can be found in a supplemental file named appendixpaper.pdf.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
